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The main objective of this research is to use 
prediction markets as negotiation agents, for 
supporting R&D portfolio management. To support 
this research, we iteratively designed, developed, 
operated and evaluated several prototypes. We start by 
presenting the weaknesses of the current techniques for 
managing R&D portfolio. Then, we intend to 
demonstrate that prediction markets correct these 
weaknesses in R&D portfolio management. 
Furthermore, following a design science paradigm, we 
illustrate the design of our artifacts using build-and-
evaluate loops supported with a field study, which 




R&D portfolio management is a critical task for the 
majority of the large companies. Several studies 
evaluated the practices in “Fortune 500” companies, 
finding that there is neither a single method nor a 
solution applicable to all companies [8, 20]. The most 
recent investigations [7, 9] showed that to be effective, 
portfolio management must apply a mix of various 
qualitative and quantitative methods. The use of 
quantitative methods presents weaknesses, mainly for 
(1) selecting the right criteria, (2) collecting the data, 
(3) and negotiating the portfolio between the different 
stakeholders. 
Whereas many stakeholders, such as the different 
business units, are involved in the portfolio decision 
process, a “negotiation support systems” could be the 
appropriate solution to speed up the process. However, 
it will not significantly reduce the communication 
effort. We suggest a paradigm shift with a new tool to 
address the portfolio selection. 
The research assumption is that a prediction market 
could improve R&D portfolio management. Prediction 
markets are future markets evaluating the projects 
potential of a portfolio. Prediction markets collect 
information from different actors, who trade on the 
market, and aggregate this information in an 
automatically negotiated equilibrium price, 
corresponding to the valuation of the project. Such 
market mechanism addresses the three weaknesses 
mentioned above: (1) no more criteria to be explicitly 
selected, (2) less data to be collected, and (3) fewer 
issues to be explicitly negotiated between actors. These 
three activities are replaced by the buy and sell trading 
of claims concerning portfolio contents. 
For this research, we adopted a design science 
method, with its build-and-evaluate loop. We designed 
and implemented different versions of prediction 
markets, which we operated and evaluated on small 
and large-scale experiments. 
The next section presents the R&D portfolio 
management and its weaknesses. Section 3 gives the 
prediction market foundations, its automatic 
negotiation kernel, and the advantages in a R&D 
context. Section 4 defines the artifact we designed and 
describes the main design issues. Section 5 presents the 
evaluation phase; we suggest 5 lessons based on the 
experiments we managed for operating and validating 
prediction markets. 
2. R&D Portfolio Management 
R&D project portfolio selection is a periodic 
activity, which aims at optimizing the research effort of 
the company. It enables the company to select a 
portfolio which corresponds to its strategic objectives, 
without exceeding the resources available. The 
selection of a powerful project portfolio is a delicate 
exercise. On one hand, it requires wide competencies 
of strategic management and the associated tools 
regarding the objective criteria. On the other hand, it 
necessitates very good competencies in negotiation 
regarding the subjective criteria as well as the final 
choice of the portfolio composition. 
"The portfolio decision process is characterized by 
uncertain and changing information, dynamic 
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opportunities, multiple goals and strategic 
considerations, interdependence among projects, and 
multiple decision makers and locations" [9]. 
Chien [7] provided an extensive literature review on 
portfolio selection and showed the inherent limitations 
in the existing R&D project selection models as 
follows: (1) inadequate treatment of multiple, often 
interrelated, evaluation criteria; (2) inadequate 
treatment of interrelationships among projects; (3) 
inability to handle non-monetary aspects; e.g. diversity 
among projects; (4) no explicit recognition and 
incorporation of the experience and knowledge of the 
R&D managers (i.e. the decision makers) and (5) 
perceptions by R&D managers that the models are 
difficult to understand and use. 
Cooper [9] showed that the combination of 
individually good projects unnecessarily constitutes the 
optimal portfolio for the firm. This is often the case 
with firms having too many trivial projects and not 
many projects to yield major competitive advantage. 
Many authors proposed different frameworks for 
selecting R&D projects portfolio [1, 7, 9, 27]. 
The invariants of these different frameworks are: (1) 
maximizing the value of the portfolio, (2) achieving a 
balanced portfolio and (3) building strategy into the 
portfolio. 
Whereas the two last stages are relatively well 
documented and supported by different frameworks 
using very widespread visualization techniques like 
bubble diagrams and scoring models, the first stage is 
the subject of a plethora of different methods which 
require large investments in time and resources for the 
data collection. 
Liyanage refers to more than 200 quantitative and 
qualitative methods for selecting R&D projects in his 
study [21]. The most often used methods are: the Net 
Present Value, the Expected Commercial Value, the 
Productivity Index, the Options Pricing Theory and the 
Dynamic Rank-Ordered List. All these methods rely on 
various data which must be collected/evaluated or 
estimated before being used in the models. The 
principal issue concerning these data is their 
inaccuracy or unreliability, making the financial 
methods yielding the worst portfolio results [9]. This is 
not related to the fact that these models lack rigor; 
rather, it results from very poor data and forecasting in 
new product projects. 
We raised three main issues: (1) selecting the right 
criteria, (2) collecting the data and (3) negotiating the 
evaluation. These issues are presented in the following 
sections. In Section 3, we will then show how 
prediction markets can solve these issues. 
2.1 Selecting the right criteria 
To be able to compare different projects at different 
stage with different goals, the senior managers first 
have to select the right criteria, applicable to all 
projects. These criteria may be financial like NPV or 
ECV, commercial like market shares, based on the 
consumed or planned resources, related to the pricing 
or the probability of technical success. To select the 
right set of criteria, the company uses the experience of 
its senior managers as well as some intern guidelines, 
principally financial and used in the budgeting process. 
This set of criteria can be elaborated iteratively by the 
experts with Delphi-like or NSS methods. The output 
of this process is very important because it will 
influence the selection process of the portfolio. 
2.2 Collecting the data 
Once the criteria determined, it is necessary to 
collect the quantitative information necessary to their 
evaluation. During the initial stage of the project, the 
lack of concrete information leads the various experts 
to make projections, estimates or extrapolations to 
quantify the various indicators. More reliable data will 
only be available later, according to the project 
advance. Consequently, their use in a sophisticated 
mathematical model has only little significance in 
phase of launching and could lead to very inaccurate 
results. However, this initial phase is of great 
importance for the decision to incorporate or not the 
new project in the global portfolio. 
Another problem concerning the data collection is 
the constant update of these data during the whole 
project life. Even if the data tend to approach reality 
according to the project advance, their acquisition 
remains tiresome. Whereas certain data can be easily 
extracted from the company’s reporting tools, some 
require a lot of work. Thus, for example, the data 
concerning new technologies acceptance, future market 
shares, product lifespan, competitors’ actions as well as 
others must be the subject of a new study for each 
portfolio actualization. This makes the process 
inflexible and often leads managers to use obsolete 
data, having no time and resources to gather up-to-date 
information. 
2.3 Negotiating the evaluation 
Since the R&D portfolio management is often a 
team activity and implies several stakeholders (i.e. 
business units), the decision issues and positions are 
often the result of a negotiation process. In line with 
the previous comment on criteria selection, R&D 
portfolio management could be considered as a multi-
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actor negotiation or multi-criteria decision-making 
process [5]. Several models have been proposed in the 
negotiation literature. Kersten [19] suggests a 
negotiation model with 5 phases: (1) search for arena 
and selection of communication mode (synchronous or 
not), (2) agenda setting (decision attributes), (3) 
exploring the field (best alternatives for negotiation 
agreement), (4) narrowing the difference and searching 
for the agreements (with compromises, offers and 
counter-offers, ...), and (5) agreement assessment and 
fulfillment. This kind of model and the associated 
Negotiation Support Systems (NSS) facilitate 
communication activities. However, they speed the 
process and eliminate ambiguities but they do not 
reduce the communication intensity. We claim that 
with a new paradigm we could drastically reduce the 
communication effort itself, substituting the multi-
stakeholder negotiation process by a market 
mechanism. 
To solve these recurring problems, we propose to 
use a technique, derived from financial theories, which 
is based on prediction markets. The prediction markets 
are future markets whose assets are tied to a particular 
project. The main characteristic of these markets is to 
be able to incorporate a wide range of information 
disseminated through a great number of actors having 
very different interests. Information is automatically 
aggregated into one negotiated equilibrium price, the 
discrete evaluation of the value of the project. 
Although, to our knowledge, prediction markets 
were not yet used in this configuration, using a 
prediction market in complement of qualitative 
methods, must allow managers to obtain discrete data 
in a relatively economic and fast way. In addition, by 
their nature, prediction markets allow to obtain not 
only one discrete value at a given time, but also the 
evolution of this equilibrium during the whole project 
life, making this value much significant than a simple 
discrete value. 
3. Prediction markets foundations 
There are many definitions of prediction markets, 
idea futures (IF) markets, information markets, virtual 
stock markets (VSM), securities trading of concepts 
(STOC) markets. Hanson, one of the fathers of this 
concept recently wrote: 
"Information markets can be used to elicit a 
collective estimate of the expected value or probability 
of a random variable, reflecting information dispersed 
across an entire population of traders. The market 
prediction is not usually an average or median of 
individual opinions, but is a complex summarization 
reflecting the game-theoretic interplay of traders as 
they obtain and leverage information, and as they react 
to the actions of others obtaining and leveraging their 
own information" [16]. 
Prediction markets have been used in many 
different public contexts and used as case studies in 
many scientific papers. The Iowa Electronic Market1 
(IEM) is a well-known small-scale, on-line, real-
money, prediction market, run by the University of 
Iowa, in which contracts correspond to political or 
economic events. The Hollywood Stock Exchange2 is 
an e-market along the same lines as the IEM, which 
allows people to use virtual currency to speculate on 
movie-related questions. Other examples include 
TradeSports3, a futures electronic market or gambling 
forum, initially for sports events, and now for a rich set 
of political futures, financial contracts, and 
entertainment. The Foresight Exchange4 is a play-
money prediction market to test the ability to predict 
the outcome of future events, check the odds of 
upcoming events, and make bets, among others for 
science and technology events. NewsFutures5 also 
trades political, finance, and technology 
(pharmaceutical) events, with virtual currency but real 
prizes. The Tech Buzz Game6 is a play-money market 
hosted by Yahoo! Research in collaboration with 
O'Reilly about the future of technology. It is also the 
first market using the dynamic pari-mutuel (DPM) 
automated market maker algorithm from Pennock [22]. 
A final example of public e-markets is the 
controversial and rapidly-aborted Policy Analysis 
Market, or FutureMap [13] sponsored by the US 
Department of Defense, which should have allowed 
speculating about strategic and geopolitical issues. 
Prediction markets have also been used inside 
corporations. An internal market, Information 
Aggregation Mechanism or IAM, at Hewlett-Packard 
produced more accurate forecasts of printer's sales than 
the firm’s internal specialists [23]. At Siemens, an 
internal market was tested for predicting the progress 
(due date) of a software project better than 
conventional planning tools. The MIT Securities 
Trading of Concepts or STOC has used the pricing 
mechanism for marketing research using pseudo-
securities market to measure preferences relating to 
new products. Berg [4] shows how prediction markets 
can be used for decision support. Finally, Google 
launched an internal market to forecast product launch 
dates, new office openings, and many other items of 
strategic importance to Google. 
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The first software platform and open source toolkits 
are appearing for building prediction markets. 
NewsFutures7 licenses its proprietary Prediction Trader 
platform8 to enable the rapid development, operation, 
and administration of prediction markets. Prediction 
Trader is used to power MIT Technology Review's 
Innovation Futures: a prediction exchange concerning 
emerging technologies and the business of 
technological innovation. Hibbert [18] proposes 
developing an open-source toolkit for creating 
prediction markets, called Zocalo9, in order to catalyze 
broader adoption of markets in academia, industry, and 
throughout society. 
Many scientific papers studied the design of 
prediction markets as well as their principal issues. 
Spann [26] evaluates different design possibilities as 
well as the forecast accuracy and performance of 
prediction markets compared to expert prediction for 
their application to business forecasting. He shows that 
the markets bet the experts most of the time. 
Furthermore, he proposes a new validity test for 
prediction markets forecasts. Chen [6] proposes and 
experimentally verifies a market-based method to 
aggregate scattered information so as to produce 
reliable forecasts regarding uncertain events; he 
empirically demonstrates that nonlinear aggregation 
mechanisms vastly outperform both the imperfect 
market and the best informed traders. Wolfers [28] 
showed that the success of the prediction market in 
generating trade depends critically on attracting 
uninformed traders. To solve this issue, prediction 
markets can incorporate various trading and rewarding 
mechanisms. Servan-Schreiber [25] sets up a real-
world on-line experiment showing that play-money 
markets with real prizes performed as well as real 
money markets. They speculate that real-money 
markets may better motivate information discovery 
while play-money markets may yield more efficient 
information aggregation. Whereas simplest prediction 
markets use a continuous double auction mechanism, 
most advanced implement a market maker in order to 
fluidize the transactions and to optimize the 
information aggregation mechanism. After introducing 
market scoring rules, Hanson [12] considers several 
design issues, including how to represent variables in 
order to support both conditional and unconditional 
estimates, how to avoid becoming a money pump via 
errors in calculating probabilities, and how to ensure 
that users can cover their bets, without needlessly 
preventing them from using previous bets as collateral 
for future bets. Finally, Rhode [24] studied a century of 




manipulations of prediction markets. His work 
suggests that it is difficult and expensive to manipulate 
prediction markets beyond short periods of time. 
Studies on TradeSport point out that manipulations are 
reverted within minutes by other traders. 
We will now show how prediction markets can 
solve the issues raised in Section 2 and be applied to 
R&D portfolio management. 
3.1 Selecting the right criteria 
Used for R&D portfolio management, prediction 
markets allow, once the project proposal been released, 
creating a new claim tied to the project and put on the 
market. As of this moment, all the actors directly or 
indirectly linked to the project, can trade (buy or sell) 
contracts concerning the project, based on their own 
appreciation of the project. The traders are the leaders 
and the teams of the project, but also the senior 
management, people from marketing, finance, as well 
as from all the other businesses units concerned by the 
R & D. Their narrow expertise of a particular company 
activity, like research, but also marketing, sales, 
customer care or finance will enable them to form their 
own opinion about the project, under the particular 
lighting of their activity field. The result of all 
aggregated appreciations will de facto include a 
multitude of implicit criteria related to all company 
activities. It becomes thus easy to obtain a discrete 
evaluation of each project, allowing classifying them 
by order of importance or clusters. 
Using implicit comparison criteria, prediction 
markets enable to reach a great diversity of 
appreciation criteria in a completely transparent way 
and to aggregate them in a price, representing the 
actual consensus on the claim. This is particularly true 
when an ontology, shared by all actors, is used to 
describe the projects claims, enabling each trader to 
have the same reference frame. 
3.2 Collecting the data 
In an R&D portfolio management context, 
prediction markets enable each actor, at any time, to 
integrate his private information by buying or selling 
contracts according to the difference between the 
equilibrium and its own confidence. In this manner, the 
equilibrium price, while undergoing constant 
adjustments, will gradually incorporate more and more 
information due to the aggregating mechanism of the 
market. The trader’s goal being to maximize its 
personal performance on the market, he will try to 
make profit each time he is in possession of 
information enabling him to adjust his position. To 
motivate him to be reactive, the prediction market 
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enables to rank the traders obtaining the best 
performances, performances which can be rewarded by 
the company in form of prizes or bonus. 
Finally, the use of prediction markets for R&D 
allows solving another problem concerning the 
portfolio maximization: the update of the data. Very 
often, the data cannot be regularly updated for the 
portfolio reviews and the senior management has to 
deal with the progress reports to base their analysis. 
With the prediction markets, the quote of the contract 
is fluctuating throughout the whole project life, after 
each transaction carried out by the traders. Thus, any 
modification of an internal or external factor related to 
the project will initiate a buy or sell order issued by the 
actor in possession of new information. This 
transaction will make evolve the price to a new 
equilibrium. In this manner, the senior managers can 
base their decision not only on the price of the contract 
at a given moment, but also on its evolution during a 
given period. This concept of continuity of the 
evaluation also allows a better comparison between 
projects. In addition to one discrete value, it allows a 
comparison of the trend of the price of each contract 
(i.e. projects in a growing or declining phase). 
Using a relatively basic mechanism, based on the 
buy and the sell of contracts, prediction markets can 
aggregate very efficiently and in real time the 
information disseminated between a wide range of 
actors, making superfluous the implementation of a 
specific actualization process. In addition, this quote 
not only represents the actualized consensus 
concerning the value of the project, but also represents 
the evolution of this consensus during the whole 
project life. 
3.3 Negotiating the evaluation 
On an R&D prediction market, the negotiations of 
each project relative value is the result of the various 
sell or buy orders placed by the traders. These orders 
are processed by a market maker in a completely 
automatic way, allowing to carry out the transaction 
and to establish the new equilibrium price. Thus 
instead of using an inter-actors negotiation support 
system, we use a transparent system allowing each 
actor, at any time, to negotiate a new equilibrium price 
with the market-maker. 
In addition, like the stock exchange portfolios, the 
traders do not rely on unlimited resources. Their 
relative influence on the market evolves according to 
their performances. Thus, the best informed traders 
will benefit from the appreciation errors of the less 
informed ones or from those trying to manipulate the 
quotation to make profit and to increase their influence 
on the market. At the same time, relative to their losses 
on the market, the others traders will see their 
possibility of influencing the course reduced. For that 
reason and in spite of the significant actors’ number, 
the equilibrium price is the result of a consensus 
between all the actors, according to their relative 
influence, not based on their position in the company, 
but on their overall performance. 
Using an automatic market-maker, prediction 
markets enable obtaining a continuous negotiation of 
the value of each project of the portfolio among all the 
actors, according to their relative influence on the 
market. In addition, this mechanism allows obtaining a 
greater adhesion towards the decisions since the price 
at a given moment is the result of the negotiation of all 
actors concerning the advisability of carrying out a 
given project. 
4. Design issues 
To design our prediction market named MarMix we 
adopted the recommended build-and-evaluate loop 
from the design science framework [17]. An artifact is 
built and assessed with a field study before being 
refined and reassessed. In our case, these field studies 
started with a small number of actors and conclude by 
involving more than 200 actors. We conducted three 
iterations of this loop, which are briefly presented in 
the next chapter. 
 
Choice of forecasting goal:
Selection and description of
prediction issue
Incentives for participation and 
information revelation:
 Composition of initial portfolios
 Choice of incentive mechanism
Financial market design:
Choice of trading mechanism
and market rules
 
Figure 1. Steps for designing a virtual stock market 
from Spann and Skiera [26] 
To support our design, we reviewed all the open-
source prediction markets available at the time of our 
first experiment. We decided to improve the work of 
Peter McCluskey on USIFEX10. His prediction market 
had the advantage of having been developed with a 
robust object-oriented programming methodology. In 
                                                
10 http://www.usifex.com/ 
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addition, USIFEX was also the most complete 
software, implementing the majority of our 
requirements. 
The R&D community we consider in this research 
is a Swiss NSF program in the field of mobile 
information and communication systems. In order to 
define the characteristics of our prototype, we carried 
out a series of interviews during summer 2005 with 
researchers involved in the project, and with the person 
in charge of the project.  
Finally, we adopted the three Steps for Designing a 
Virtual Stock Market from Spann and Skiera [26] 
(Figure 1) to design our artifact, as presented in the 
following sections. 
4.1 Choice of forecasting goal 
Prediction markets are able to make different types 
of predictions: YES/NO e.g. "We will sell 12000 
pieces of product X during April 2008", linear e.g. 
"How many pieces of product X will be sold during 
April 2008?" or discrete e.g. "Project X will finish: a) 
in advance, b) on time, c) late". We chose a basic 
model, namely the forecasting of the occurrence or 
nonoccurrence of a particular event, in our case, the 
success of a particular project at his planned end. The 
payoff function related to this model is a "Winner takes 











 di,T  = cash dividend of the stock modeling the outcome of 
the ith event at time T, 
 I  = index set of events, 
 T  = point or period in time that is relevant for the 
determination of the outcome of the event, 
 v  = cash dividend value. 
Claim description. To allow each trader to acquire the 
same contracts comprehension, whatever his activity 
is, we improved MarMix by the development of a 
specific ontology to describe the projects claims. The 
goal of this ontology is to standardize the description 
of the claims to allow traders coming from other 
domains to quickly understand the underlying 
concepts. Our ontology takes the concepts of the 
futures markets and adds the specific concepts of the 
description of R&D projects. Currently, the focus of 
the presented ontology is on research projects rather 
than on development ones. 
We decided to split the definition of the claims into 
two parts. The first relates to the elements described as 
structural, which define the claim's terms, and the 
second defines the claim's proposal. 
The structural elements are defined in such a way 
that all traders are rapidly able to understand the main 
points of the contract properties. They consist of the 
description, the judgment, the price and the type of the 
claim. 
Due to the diversity of the prediction markets and 
the related claims, it is difficult to propose a generic 
framework for defining claim's proposal. We tried to 
characterize claims based on the interviews carried out 
at the beginning of the project as well as on the active 
claims on the other markets. We noticed five important 
concepts: the sphere of activity, the state of the art, the 
goal of the research, the expected results and the 
measure of success, illustrated by the SLF claim in 
Table 1. 
 
Table 1. The SLF claim on MarMix 
Symbol SLF 
Name Sensor-Network deployed by SLF 
Type Boolean 
Project Real-time avalanche and landslide analysis 
through sensor networks 
Settle date 31.07.2009 
Price Minimum price: 0, maximum: 100 
Payment Winner-Takes-All (if the contract is TRUE: 1, 
if not: 0) 
Field of research 
 Research on sensor-networks 
State of the art 
 The fluid-dynamics models used so far in predicting 
mass movements such as avalanches rely on speculative 
equations and very little is known about the internal 
structure of avalanches. Field measurements only 
provide insight into shape characteristics (e.g., 
avalanche speed). 
Goal of the research 
 The sensor network measures the displacement/velocity 
field inside a flowing bulk. Before the material is 
released, the sensor nodes are spread onto the surface or 
inside the material. After release, the information of 
each node is monitored to determine the flow structure. 
The main tasks are twofold: constructing a sensor 
network and interpreting the data to build more 
accurate fluid-dynamics models. 
Expected Results 
 Deployment of a sensor-network under real conditions 
to predict the risks of avalanche 
Measure of success 
 The SLF deployed a network of 100 nodes in an alpine 
area to predict the risks of avalanche. The results 
obtained by the sensors, as well as the treatments using 
fluid-dynamics models, allow us to obtain valid results 
with an error margin of 20% during a season (01.11 to 
the 30.04). 
 
The state-of-the-art section gives a short 
presentation of the research history. In this category we 
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describe the previous steps necessary to formulate the 
goal of the research, the related work and present some 
major publications in the field. Such information will 
enable each researcher to situate the claim in its field 
of research. 
The goal of the research describes the expected 
outcome of the research after a given time. These are 
global, long-term and not precisely defined goals, as 
they represent research in progress. 
The expected results are the concrete elements, in 
the mid-term, that will result from the research. They 
may be products, demonstrations, patents, algorithms, 
creation of start-ups, standards or RFC. 
The measure of success must precisely express the 
methods of evaluation of the awaited results. This 
evaluation should be objective and factual. We could, 
for example, specify the product's market share, the 
acceptance of a demonstration by the scientific 
community, the use of a patent and the publication of 
the results by the press. 
 
IPO. We chose to treat the claims management in a 
different way from other prediction markets, which use 
a top-down process. Indeed, to guarantee the 
transmission of information between the researchers 
and the market, each trader was allowed to trade on the 
available claims. He was also allowed to propose new 
claims in connection with his field of research to test 
his research proposal before submitting an official 
project to his hierarchy. This led us to define a process 
of an IPO in four stages: (1) claim proposal, (2) 
discussion on the formulation of the claim, (3) price 
determination, by putting limit orders on the claim and 
finally (4) opening of the trade on the market. 
4.2 Incentives 
Based on the fact that there are no significant 
differences between real-money and play-money 
markets, as shown by Servan-Schreiber [25], we 
designed the market as a play-money market with 
tournaments based on individual performance level. 
Moreover, we included a play-money reward for 
traders who created new claims on the market, based 
on the quantity of contracts sold during the claim's life. 
Our choice of a play-money market was driven by the 
suggestion that researchers involved in the project are 
more likely to trade with play-money than with their 
own money. This configuration also allows us to attract 
less informed players, who do not take any personal 
risk, but improve the liquidity of the market [28]. 
Finally, this setup of the market has the advantage of 
enabling us to omit the legal considerations related to a 
real-money market, as stated in [2, 3, 10]. 
To ensure that the study was relevant, we started the 
market during a workshop in the presence of hundred 
researchers. We proceeded with a workshop in the 
presence of computer scientists and telecom engineers 
without any financial background, followed by a long-
term experiment. 
After a first series of interviews, we noticed that 
interest is quite present within the community for this 
type of technology but the teams are centered on 
specific problems. Furthermore, it is difficult to get 
them interested in questions outside their field of work. 
Thus, we assume that the organization of workshops 
bringing together the participants by field of interest 
will create a certain dynamic on the platform, even if 
the traders limit themselves to a small proportion of the 
available claims. 
We also tried to communicate the information to the 
traders via different channels such as email and 
information displays in the buildings. The latter played 
an important role in motivating the traders, and in 
some cases was more important than the prize itself. 
 
Interfaces. Our goal was to develop a very intuitive 
interface in terms of usability, hiding the excessive 
financial aspects of the marketplace, to reduce the 
learning curve. 
In order to play on the market, the trader needs 
enough private information to optimize his return on 
investment but also needs enough information from the 
market to take the right investment decision. For this 
purpose, we implemented various decision support 
information like graphics with daily, weekly, monthly 
and complete quote histories, historics of the daily 
quotes with trends and summaries, various top ten lists 
such as the biggest movements, gains, losses, the most 
active traders, claims. We also extended the real-time 
quotes with short- and long-term trends for each claim. 
We also implemented a "1-Click trading" option to 
allow traders to pass market orders by directly clicking 
on a quote or to pass limit orders by clicking on the 
reverse transaction on order books. This option will be 
enhanced in the next release to allow traders to enter 
their own confidence related to a particular claim and 
pass the corresponding order on the market. 
Finally, we added the possibility of trading via 
cellular phones, based on short text messages (SMS). 
In addition to the advantages in terms of portability, 
this development allowed us to simplify the 
interactions between the traders and the platform. We 
developed a syntax to reduce the instructions to the 
minimum, and to ensure that the exchanged messages 
conform to the SMS format. For example, the user 
send, "MARMIX BUY 25 SENSOR" to pass an order 
of 25 contracts of the claim sensor at the market price 
on the MarMix prediction market. 
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4.3 Market design 
To avoid falling into the problems of small markets 
(lack of movements and liquidity), we chose a 
continuous double auction mechanism with a market 
maker. On a prediction market, the market maker 
should be considered as an automatic negotiation 
agent, processing all buy and sell orders of the traders. 
This choice ensures that the traders can express their 
forecasts at any time, whatever the positions of the 
other traders. For the first prototype we selected 
logarithmic market-maker mechanism. 
We rapidly realized that the chosen automated 
market maker algorithm, inspired by Hanson [14], was 
not designed to support large-scale experiments. The 
market price overreacts if many small orders and, in 
particular, short orders are put in, allowing traders to 
make disproportionate profits. Although this algorithm 
worked well on a small market, the number of 
concurrent orders placed at the same time on this large 
market showed the limits of our choice. Moreover, this 
function did not take into account the open orders in 
the book to establish the market price. 
After reviewing the literature, we chose the design 
proposition of Hanson based both on a combinatorial 
market maker algorithm and on a book of orders [11]. 
This proposition is based on two other publications by 
Hanson, the Logarithmic Market Scoring Rules [15] 
and the Combinatorial Information Market Design 
[12]. We were also inspired by the work of Chris 
Hibbert on Zocalo for the implementation of these 
algorithms. 
5. Evaluation of the Experiments 
To test our design choices, we ran three experiments 
as stated in Section 4. We chose to iteratively test the 
interfaces and incentives, the market mechanism as 
well as the market-maker algorithm and finally the 
claim description and the incentives again in three 
separate experiments. This allowed us to focus the 
experiments on specific design issues. For this reason, 
we used non R&D claims for the first two iterations, 
allowing us to carry out the experiments with students 
and staff from the university whereas the third iteration 
was carried out with the project R&D program and 
researchers. 
This first experiment gave us the opportunity to test 
the various mechanisms of prediction markets and to 
implement the design choices elaborated during the 
design phase. We experimented with a simple 
prediction market with few actors since Chen [6] 
illustrated that small markets are able to make accurate 
predictions. 
To evaluate our design, we operated the prediction 
market and conducted several exploratory interviews 
with the actors of the experiment at the end of October 
2005. We used the prediction market for a “one hour” 
laboratory experiment with 15 researchers trading five 
contracts, followed by a two-week experiment during 
which about thirty traders were able to trade the same 
five contracts. 
The considerable difference in the number of 
participants between the two experiments showed us 
that the basic mechanisms of futures markets are not 
known by the researchers and that consequently, 
without direct supervision and an incentive 
mechanism, researchers are not motivated to trade on 
such a market. 
 
Table 2. Key numbers resulting from the first 
experiment 
Number of traders 28 
Number of active traders (> 3 orders) 11 
Average orders by trader 26 
Number of claims 5 
Number of orders 286 
Number of contracts 5093 
 
After our first small-scale experiment, we decided 
to run a second large-scale experiment to test the 
prototype. This second experiment took place with 99 
traders, playing during six weeks on 16 claims in 
summer 2006. During the whole experiment, we had a 
total of 3'071 transactions, representing 144'248 
contracts. 
At the same time, we ran another experiment with 
the same prototype, dedicated to the prediction of the 
organizing city of the 2014 Winter Olympic Games, 
with 50 traders coming from various sport federations 
and specialized media. 
 
Table 3. Key numbers resulting from the second 
experiment 
Number of traders 114 
Number of active traders (> 3 orders) 99 
Average orders by trader 31 
Number of claims 16 
Number of orders 3'071 
Number of contracts 144'248 
 
Finally, we started our third experiment (still in 
progress) with the project researchers and claims about 
mobile information and communication systems. The 
claims used at the beginning of this iteration are shown 
in Table 4. 
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Table 4. Claims' list at the beginning of the third 
iteration 
CAR Large scale (10 vehicles) vehicular 
network test 
AVALANCHE Sensor-networks deployed by the Swiss 
Federal Institute for Snow and Avalanche 
to detect the risks of avalanche in alpine 
regions 
RFID Mobile Phones with RFID in Switzerland 
ROBOTS Robots detect a ringing phone among a 
hundred faster than humans 
MPAYMENT At the meeting of 2009, the majority of 
the part-icipants will pay their train ticket 
by mobile phone 
BUILDING Users helped by ludic interfaces are 
better than intelligent buildings in energy 
saving 
 
Our experiments supported with our artifact led us 
to formulate five propositions to design a predictions 
market for R & D portfolio management. 
 
Proposition 1: A prediction market for R&D should 
integrate a standard framework to support claim 
formulation. 
Using an indicator incorporated in the form of a 
price makes the evaluations comprehensible by all 
actors. Consequently, it is advisable to make sure that 
independently of their activity the traders have the 
same claims comprehension. Moreover, a structured 
framework helps defining claims or structuring 
interviews with concerned peoples. 
 
Proposition 2: A prediction market for R&D should 
integrate an easy IPO mechanism to support the 
innovation process. 
The prediction market should allow researchers to 
test their research ideas among all actors, without 
needing a review process or preliminary validation. 
This direct access to the market removes internal 
barriers to innovation without requiring modifying 
usual selection processes. 
 
Proposition 3: A prediction market for R&D should 
occult the financial mechanisms to reduce the trader's 
learning curve and increase his incentive 
Observations resulting from our interviews showed 
that the researchers are by no means familiar with the 
underlying concepts such as limit orders necessary to 
play on a prediction market, which results in errors and 
discourages them from playing on the market. This 
implies specific usability requirements on the human-
computer interface. 
 
Proposition 4: A prediction market for R&D should 
allow the combination of group sessions with 
individual sessions to increase the incentive of the 
traders. 
Group sessions allow obtaining very quickly an 
evaluation of the portfolio, generating a specific 
dynamic. Siemens used this configuration during one 
hour meetings, but it could also be used in a distance 
synchronous trading way (e.g. by opening the market 
for one hour every month). 
 
Proposition 5: A prediction market for R&D should 
integrate an automatic negotiation agent (i.e. market 
maker to increase the quality of the evaluation). 
The market maker makes the market more reactive 
and fluid, allowing the traders to buy or sell each time 
new information is available. Thus the evaluation will 
aggregate more information, compared to a double 
auction market were the traders must wait for a similar 
offer to make the deal. 
6. Conclusion 
In this research, we designed and experimented a 
prediction market in an R&D context. We confirmed 
the hypothesis that prediction markets seem to be 
suitable for supporting negotiated R&D portfolio 
management. 
We first exposed the current situation of R&D 
portfolio management in order to heighten awareness 
of the problem. We then provide a short description of 
the research carried out in prediction markets and what 
techniques have been used so far to study the 
phenomena of interest. We also expose the different 
theoretical foundations used in current prediction 
market research and justify our methodology choice. 
Our research contribution takes the form of five 
propositions to design a predictions market for R & D 
portfolio management. These propositions mainly 
concern: (1) a framework and a process for defining 
parts of an R&D portfolio, (2) a human-computer 
interface and a groupware setting with high usability 
requirement, (3) an automatic negotiation market 
maker. 
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